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Abstract 
 
A robust bank industry is a major player in the stability of an economy, and therefore the 
macroeconomic decisions of most countries revolve around the bank-based financial 
sector. The Ghana financial industry witnessed a cleanup exercise in 2017 due to the 
impaired conditions under which it operated in the past. This study used financial ratios 
aided by the Z-score to analyse the financial performance of UT Bank prior to the 2017 
bank industry health check in Ghana. Annual financials over a ten-year period (2007-
2016) were used. It was realised that debt management practices of UT Bank were quite 
unsatisfactory and unimpressive. This was observed in the poor leverage and risk 
management variable ratios. Considering the results, UT Bank clearly had difficulty 
obliging to customers’ maturing debts. The average mean values of debt-to-equity and 
debt-to asset of 7.6 and 0.90 respectively pointed to a case of distress. The entire bank 
sector stands to benefit if credit management practices of banks, especially UT Bank and 
all other banks that suffered the same fate, are improved on. As a policy recommendation, 
the regulator of the bank industry should tighten up its supervisory and monitoring 
powers to help in detecting early signs of non-performing banks. The study further 
recommends that statutory lending limits of banks be re-enforced to uphold the threshold 
of 10 percent for unsecured loans and 25 percent for secured loans of net owned funds of 
banks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background to the Study 
 
Torna and DeYoung (2013) have followed the sequence of global bank industry 
instability and have revealed that an estimated 10 percent of US commercial banks have 
failed in the early 1980s and 1990s. These disturbing occurrences have not spared the 
European Central Bank where 25 out of 130 largest Eurozone banks failed a distress test 
(Tassev, 2019). Similarly, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) closed down 21 banks 
between 1930 and 1958 due to leverage issues and high risk taking resulting from debt to 
asset and equity challenges (CBN Bulletin, 2010). A similar exercise was replicated in 
Kenya, where the Imperial Bank, Dubai Bank and the Chase Bank were closed down for 
various reasons of non-performing loans, liquidity challenges, credit risk mismanagement 
and capital deficiency (Taboi, 2017).  Indeed, it will constitute a half-baked discussion on 
global bank collapse without a mention of Barings Bank, Enron and Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc as central points of reference to emerging financial malfeasance. History 
identifies the year 1995, 25 February as a period that witnessed the unfortunate and 
“unbaillable” collapse of Barings bank of England. The root cause of the collapse was the 
over ambitious engagement in a secret derivative bet trade by one of its employees (Nick 
Leeson). 
 Over the immediate past few years, the Ghana bank industry has had its portion of 
these crises culminating into a loss of about 2,700 jobs with an estimated debt pile of 1.7 
US dollars (Nyalatorgbi, 2019). The governor of Bank of Ghana (BoG), Dr. Ernest Ad-
dison, attributed the crisis to poor banking practices, weak supervision and indifference to 
regulatory measures by the immediate past administration of the Central Bank.  Most of 
the affected banks were found to have exceeded their regulatory single obligor limits, the 
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governor revealed. For instance, the UT Bank exceeded its single obligor limit of 
GH¢20m when it advanced a loan of GH300m to a politically exposed customer, the 
governor added (Nyalatorgbi, 2019). Apart from the aforementioned, uncertainties 
surrounding the source of shareholder funds raised suspicions (Ghana Banking Survey, 
2019). 
The Banks and Special Deposit-Taking institutions Acts 2016 (Act 930), Section 
62 of Ghana has a legal lending limit which demands that beyond a certain threshold of 
unimpaired capital and surplus accounts, the bank is not permitted to grant a loan to a 
single customer. This requirement is meant to reduce the risk exposure of a single 
customer.  It further emphasises that, depending on whether such a loan is secured or 
unsecured, it must not exceeding 10 percent of net owned funds of the bank in the case of 
an unsecured loan and not more than 25 percent if a loan is collateralized (see Abor et al, 
2019). 
 
 
 
Ghanaian banks that suffered this crisis showed early symptoms of distress when 
they started depending heavily on emergency financial facilities from the regulator to 
meet depositors’ withdrawal requests. After the crisis, it was established that, certain 
banks never provided collateral before liquidity support was given to them and that these 
funds were eventually misapplied (Nyalatorgbi, 2019). The governor of BoG noted that, 
Uni-Bank for instance, loaned out an undisclosed sum to Belstar Capital Ltd to acquire 
shares in Agricultural Development Bank. This move was to facilitate Uni-Bank’s bid to 
becoming the third largest stockholder of Agricultural Development Bank of Ghana. 
Overzealous equity owners of banks coupled with internal wrangling with bank managers 
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over lending threshold and a neglect of best risk management practices are central to most 
banks’ distress situations. 
An estimated GH860m and GH620m in liquidity support were given to the UT 
Bank and Capital Bank respectively in 2015 by the BoG to strengthen their operations. 
All these notwithstanding, issues of rising non-performing loans and capitalisation 
challenges eventually broke the camel’s back as it compelled the central bank to unleash 
the inevitable measures to salvage deposits of unsuspecting customers (Nyalatorgbi, 
2019). The reports further states; between 2015 and 2018, Uni-Bank took an estimated 
GH3.1billion, of which more than half was uncollateralized, exposing the central bank 
itself to a naked risk. Having observed these, closures, mergers and takeovers of certain 
banks are said to have been politically motivated and rushly executed.  This study was 
undertaken to indeed accept or otherwise of the general null hypothesize of the Ghanaian 
society on realities regarding bank closures and mergers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of Related Literature 
 
Embarking on the bank sector “health check”, the Central Bank of Ghana 
considered a number of parameters that pointed to non-performance.  The profit structure 
relationship is one of available theories that are linked to bank performance as it has 
attracted much attention in industrial finance and the bank industry. Berger (1995) 
identified two competing theories that explain the positive relationship between bank 
performance on one side and market power and efficient structure theories on the other. 
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The Market Power-Theory vs. Efficient Structure Theory 
 
Two hypotheses are linked to the market-power theory; the traditional structure-
conduct-performance and the relative market hypotheses. The traditional structure 
conduct performance (SCP) occurs where higher loan rates are determined by more 
concentrated market.  This, Aguenaous, Lahreech and Bounnakaya (2017) submit that 
tightening up of industry entry requirements forces firms to improve on efficiency in 
service delivery or are allowed for normal distribution of efficiency. Due to association 
discipline, banks can collude, reminiscent of high level of their concentration to reduce 
deposit rates. Similarly, interest on lending could be increased to enjoy relatively high 
profits due to same advantage of highly concentrated firms. There are sighted failed 
attempts to establish a strong and a significant link between market structure and bank’s 
efficiency (Aguenaous et al, 2017). In the case of Kaufman (1966), he found a non-linear 
relationship between those two variables (market structure and bank performance).  Their 
findings (Smirklock, 1985; Rhodes; 1985) were not contrary to Kaufman’s (1966). 
 
 
 
The efficiency theory is decomposed into the X-efficiency and the Scale-
efficiency hypotheses. The E-efficiency hypothesis is inclined to the view that, bank 
managers who efficiently utilise their scarce resources enjoy high profits. In this situation, 
this calibre of management is able to operate at lower cost per unit service. In the case of 
the Scale-efficient hypothesis, instead of riding on the back of efficiency, volume of 
operation is central in their argument. Those banks that have the ability to operate on 
large scale tend to do so at lower cost per service, and are able to translate operations into 
higher profits (Berger, 1995). Seelanatha (2010) studied bank’s profitability using these 
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theories. He found performance to have a high dependency on bank’s efficiency as 
opposed to the market structure.  
Plethora of researchers has had challenges with the use of market share as a 
function of efficiency (see Berger, 1995; Shepherd, 1986; Seelanatha, 2010; cited in 
Aguenaous et al, 2017). As an elongation of available empirics on bank performance 
measures, Sheikh-Waqas (2005) found a positive relationship between debt-to-equity 
ratio, equity multiplier and bank’s insolvency risk ratio. In their study of financial ratio 
approach to evaluating financial performance, Attefah and Darko (2016) realised that 
debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset and equity multiplier positively influence bank risk, 
insolvency and instability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology 
  
This study adopts a panel data analysis to test the financial performance of 
distressed banks using the Z-score (see Srairi, 2013; Lepetit, Nya, Rous & Tarazi, 2008; 
Altman, 1968). Specifically, the study looks at how justifiably distressed certain banks 
were prior to the 2017 financial turbulence in Ghana. The UT Bank Ghana is a case under 
consideration. The researcher seeks to investigate its stability and insolvency using its 
published financials between 2007 and 2016.  
 Return on Assets (RoA) is the basic variable that is traditional in computing the 
Z-score. RoA is computed by taking the balance sheet figure of income after tax dividing 
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it by the value of average Total Assets. The Z-score is also arrived at by taking the mean 
of RoA combined with Capital-to-Assets Ratio (Equity/Total Assets) further divided by 
the standard deviation of RoA.  
 
 
RoA          (   )  (     )
 (   ) ……..…………….…………...………………….. (1) 
 
It must be stressed that, equity capital to asset ratio is computed using only 
shareholders’ equity, subordinated debt exclusive (Li, Tripe & Malone, 2017).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Correspondence between the Z-score and Standard and Poor’ Rating 
 
Interpretation  Rating Zth-score 
Threshold 
 
 
Rating Zth-score 
Threshold 
 
 
 Interpretation   
 AAA > 8.15  BB+ 5.65     
  AA+ 8.15  BB 5.25     
  AA 7.6  BB- 4.95  Grey Area   
Safe Area AA- 7.3  B+ 4.75      
A+ 7  B 4.4     
 A 6.85  B- 4.15     
 A- 6.65  CCC+ 3.75     
 BBB+ 6.4  CCC+ 3.2  Distress Area   
 BBB+ 6.25  CCC- 2.5     
  BBB- 5.85  D <1.75      
Source: Altman and Hotchkiss (2006, p.314) 
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For purposes of doubtfulness, a double check was done as the study considered 
the Z-score Plus model proposed by Altman (2006) for evaluating corporate credit which 
was tested to have had between 70%-95% accuracy and reliability at different time 
periods. Accordingly, a bank with a Z-score below 1.8 has the likelihood of going 
bankrupt, while companies with a Z-score above 3 are deemed efficient and to be in good 
standing and by extension likely not to go bankrupt. Companies within the region of 1.8 
and 3.0 are said to operate in the grey area and that bankruptcy is as likely as not. 
   1  = 1.2     + 1.4     + 3.3     + 0.6      + 1.0    ……… ………………….... (2) 
 
Where 
  1 = Net Working Capital divided by Total Assets (WC/TA) 
  2 = Retained Earnings for the year divided by Total Assets (RE/TA) 
  3 = Earnings before Interest and Tax divided by Total Assets (EBIT/TA) 
  4 = Market Value of Shareholders’ Equity divided by Book Value of Total Liabilities    
        (MVE/TL) 
 5 = Revenue divided by Total Assets 
Table 2: Classification according to Altman (1993) Z-score 
 
Z-score   Safe Zone Gray Zone Distress Zone   
Initial Model 
    Z-score < 1.81 
  
       √ 
 1.81  < Z-score < 2.99 
 
     √ 
  Z-score > 2.99         √ 
   Revised Model 
    Z-score < 1.1 
   
       √ 
 1.1  <  Z-score < 2.66 
 
     √ 
  Z-score > 2.66           √       
Adopted from Alman (2006) 
 
Results and Analysis 
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The researcher analysed the financial performance of defunct UT Bank Limited 
with financials between 2007 and 2016 using a number of bank stability and insolvency 
measures. The study was limited to only UT Bank Limited due to unavailability of 
published financials of other banks that suffered the same fate. 
The Unique Trust Bank (UT Bank) Ltd was rebranded in May 2009 and got listed 
into the Ghana Stock Exchange in 2010 under the brand name UTB. It was one of 
privately owned indigenous commercial banks in Ghana prior to the revocation its licence 
together with Capital Bank Ltd amidst the 2017 bank crisis. In order to compare average 
performance over ten (10) years, analysis was done under two headings; Risk and 
Leverage / stability and solvency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk and Leverage Measurement Ratios 
 
Debt-to-Equity-Ratio (DER) 
 
DER measures long term financial stability of commercial entities. It looks at 
external claims against the bank relative to its shareholder equity. It looks at claims of 
creditors and depositors over bank assets, in our situation. Though controversial, higher 
DER is panacea for insolvency and likelihood of failure. 
 
Table 3: Bank Level Stability Variable Performance 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 µ Ơ CV 
DER 5.83 6.54 8.1 9.1 10.6 6.7 9.4 10.8 4.8 4.5 7.6 2.30 3.3 
EM 6.8 7.6 9.1 10.1 11.6 7.7 10.4 11.8 5.8 5.5 8.6 2.30 3.8 
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DAR 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.9 0.91 0.87 0.9 0.91 0.83 0.82 0.9 0.03 26.4 
Source: Author’s own computation from bank financials (2007-2016) 
DER (Debt to Equity Ratio), EM (Equity Multiplier) and DAR (Debt to Assets Ratio) 
 
 It is realised that, an average mean score of 7.6 over the ten year period was 
recorded in terms DER (see Table 3). One of the implications is that UT Bank’s creditors 
provided 0.76 pesewas (or 76% of 100%) out of every one cedi financed by the bank. In 
an unlikely event where the value of assets declines, it will have the potency of damaging 
lenders, since they have preferential rights of payment. In fact, it’s unsafe to go beyond 
50% DER threshold. That is, a bank should finance 0.5 of every GH¢1 (Creditors bear 
0.5). Equity owners are comfortable with high DER values.  The reverse is true of lenders 
and depositors. Lenders tend to interfere with the decisions of management of the bank 
due to higher DER which allows them a higher stake in financial decisions either directly 
or otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
Banks that are associated with high DER values tend to have lower borrowing 
rights, even in emergencies, since financial ratios play a very key role in how businesses 
fair. In worst scenarios, the central regulatory body could interfere in borrowing 
arrangements of banks that have a higher DER. The results of UT Bank appear to defeat 
the purpose of the efficiency theory that posits that bank managers who efficiently utilise 
their scarce resources enjoy high profits, and by protraction, continuity.  
 
Equity Multiplier (EM) 
 
Equity Multiplier (EM) is one of financial leverage ratios that is a representation 
of the proportion of bank’s assets financed by shareholders’ equity relative to lenders 
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(Asset to Equity). It is estimated that, about 70-90 percent of banks’ assets is tied to loans 
and advances (Koflowits, 2019). Table 3 shows that 8.6 percent of UT Bank’s assets were 
financed by owners’ equity as against 1.4 percent financed by lenders/customers’ 
deposits. A higher EM value draws the bank closer to risk of failure (Sheikh-Wagas, 
2005). That perhaps would have gratified investors because UT Bank used more equity to 
purchase assets than they purportedly used debt to finance assets purchase. It must 
quickly be stressed that, a higher equity multiplier ratio sometimes could be a strategy 
used by the bank to look profitable so as to purchase assets at a low cost or gain favour 
from lending institutions. 
 Traditionally, a higher EM is not a safe place for a bank to stay, and very risky as 
it is an unhealthy practice and serves as a conduit for discontinuity. It means the bank 
relies heavily on debt than it does on shareholder equity. A trigger of high default by 
debtors to the bank in the form of non-performing loans, UT Bank in this case had a high 
tendency to go distressed as was the case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Debt-to-Asset-Ratio (DAR) 
 
This ratio measures an organisation’s ability and strength to meet claims by 
creditors using company’s own resources. Higher DAR values signify increased in 
insolvency risk. Creditors have more claims on the bank’s financial and non-financial 
resources should the inevitable happen. Per the results, ownership of the bank literary 
rested with creditors. A look at UT Bank’s mean average of DAR which is pegged at 0.9,   
means out of every GH¢1 ownership claim by UT Bank, only 0.1 pesewa is really owned 
in terms of real assets. Efficiency in banking sector is paramount as it positively impacts 
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bank stability. Seelanatha (2010) studied bank profitability using the efficiency theories 
and found better performance and best management practices to have a high dependency 
on bank efficiency. Inefficient banks are associated with high debt ratios. 
 
Solvency Measurement 
 
The Z-score has gained wide spread acceptance as a measure of bank stability and 
the inverse of the probability of insolvency in the bank industry and financial stability 
literature (Bouvatier, Lepetit, Rehault and Strobel, 2017). The researcher used RoA-based 
Z-score and Altman (2006) Z-score Plus to potentially compare capitalisation and returns 
or variability and returns. This was made possible by the use of accounting data. Table 4 
has computed results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Z-scores computed from different Approaches 
  2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average   
FV-Zscore 10.6 9.4 8.3 7.6 6.8 9.4 7.4 6.8 11.8 12.3 9.04 
 LN-Zscore 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.50 2.5 2.17 
     -score 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.50 1.9 1.38   
 Source: Author’s own computation from bank financials (2007-2016) 
 
FV-Zscore (Face Value of the Z-score), LN-Zscore (Natural log of FV-Zscore) and 
(   ) (RoA-based and Altman) 
 
The Z-score is known to be highly skewed, as such; the natural log of the FV-
Zscore was used to defuse the likelihood of misleading results. As a result, the researcher 
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dwelled much on the average Z-scores of the two standardised models. With average Z-
scores of 2.17 and 1.38 produced from the RoA-based and Altman (   ) respectively, the 
researcher used Standard and Poor’s Ratings Table (Table 1) to form an opinion on the 
RoA-based Z-score per balance sheet figures. With a score of 2.17, it puts UT Bank under 
the distress condition, characterised by illiquid assets sensitive to economic downturn. In 
the case of results from Altman’s model (   ) an average score of 1.38 was obtained, 
again, placing UT Bank in the distress zone (see Table 2). 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Stability measures of banks and their ability to take risk are very central to 
arguably determine if they are capable of generating income to meet fixed cost. 
Uncontrollable rising debt is justifiably a source of concern, especially when used 
unwisely and without moderation could spark financial crisis. UT Bank’s ability to 
control its debt to assets, debt to equity and equity multiplier was weak. Per results from 
its financials and the methodology adopted by the researcher, UT Bank relied heavily on 
external debt since it was unable to internally generate adequate income to meet its fixed 
costs and to oblige to claims from creditors; hence 90% of its resource ownership literally 
was to creditors.  
Major among failed administrative indicators was poor credit risk management 
which is central to the bank’s survival. In fact, working to construct a structure of proper 
bank corporate practices, debt seemed to have been intractable to management of UT 
Bank. This certainly will invite discontinuities and challenges in which distress and 
limitations placed on borrowing were key. Most banks are noted for poor credit 
management practices and will need to be worked on if the bank industry in Ghana needs 
to restore clientele confidence. Policymakers should work on reducing systemic risk 
emanating from high leverage financial system. The researcher further suggests that bank 
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annual financials be published to allow for independent computations and unbiased 
analysis to help draw reliable conclusions. 
 
Limitation of Study 
 
Better comparison of results from many banks would have put the conclusion 
drawn in this study in a more revealing perspective. This shortfall is as a result of 
unavailability of financials of banks that suffered same fate as UTB. This problem of 
unavailability of data on certain banks is cause for worry, since their audited reports are 
relied upon to determine corporate performance. This is defiance to their financial 
reporting requirements as public entities. 
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